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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-4047 
 ___________ 
 
 JOSEPH BREELAND,  
   Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
DEBRA WAPPLES; BRAD WAPPLES, SR. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 5:12-cv-00898) 
 District Judge:  Honorable James Knoll Gardner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 12, 2014 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed February 21, 2014) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Joseph Breeland appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his amended 
complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
summarily affirm. 
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I. 
 In 2012, Breeland filed a complaint in the District Court against his former foster 
parents, Debra Wapples and Brad Wapples, Sr. (“the Wapples”).  The complaint alleged 
that, during the time that Breeland lived in the Wapples’ Pennsylvania home, they 
sexually, physically, and mentally abused him in violation of his rights under the United 
States Constitution and Pennsylvania law.  Upon screening the complaint, the District 
Court directed Breeland to file an amended complaint that provided more information 
about “(1) the Mentor of Lehigh Valley program [(the alleged program through which 
Breeland was placed in the Wapples’ home)], (2) the process that led to his placement in 
the home of the [Wapples], and (3) how his counselor [(to whom the complaint referred)] 
was involved in his case.”  (Dist. Ct. Order entered Mar. 27, 2012, at 2.) 
 Several months later, Breeland filed an amended complaint against the Wapples.  
This new pleading sought relief under § 1983 (but not under state law), alleging that the 
Wapples had subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  In light of these allegations, Breeland sought damages, as well as 
declaratory and injunctive relief. 
 The Wapples subsequently moved to dismiss Breeland’s amended complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  On September 24, 2013, the 
District Court granted that motion and dismissed the amended complaint without further 
leave to amend.  The District Court explained that, “[i]n order to state a claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a federal constitutional or 
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statutory right by a state actor.”  (Dist. Ct. Order entered Sept. 24, 2013, at 3 n.1 (citing 
Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2004)).)  The court 
went on to conclude that, in light of this Court’s decision in Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 
337, 347 (3d Cir. 2005), where we held that “foster parents in Pennsylvania are not state 
actors for purposes of liability under § 1983,” Breeland could not state a claim for relief 
against the Wapples under § 1983. 
 Breeland now appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his amended 
complaint.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant the Wapples’ motion to 
dismiss, see Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013), and 
we review the court’s decision not to afford Breeland further leave to amend for abuse of 
discretion, see id. at 217.  In reviewing a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 
claim, “we must accept all factual allegations as true, construe the [amended] complaint 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable 
reading of the [amended] complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Fleisher v. 
Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Having carefully considered Breeland’s arguments in support of his appeal, and 
for the reasons given by the District Court, we agree with the court’s decision to dismiss 
4 
 
his amended complaint without affording him further leave to amend.
1
  We note that our 
decision here does not prevent Breeland from pursuing, in the proper forum, any state law 
claims that he may have raised in his original complaint but did not reallege in his 
amended complaint.  We take no position on his likelihood of prevailing on any such 
claims.     
 Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s September 24, 2013 order.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Breeland’s amended complaint alleged that Debra Wapples is “employed” through 
Mentor of Lehigh Valley (“Mentor”).  In his opposition to the Wapples’ motion to 
dismiss, he alleged that the Wapples “are citizens, [p]rivate, independently contracted by 
Mentor,” and “[p]rivate employee[s] of Mentor’s agency.”  Finally, Breeland’s “Brief in 
Argument to Appeal” alleges that the Wapples “work” for Mentor.  We presume that the 
Wapples’ alleged affiliation with Mentor was/is simply in their role as foster parents.  But 
even if Breeland intended these allegations to refer to some additional link between the 
Wapples and Mentor, and even if we were to attempt to make sense of Breeland’s 
allegation that Mentor “is a [p]rivately state owned/operated agency,” there would still be 
no reason to disturb the District Court’s decision because there is no indication that 
Breeland can allege facts demonstrating that there was “‘such a close nexus between the 
State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as 
that of the State itself.’”  Leshko, 423 F.3d at 339 (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. 
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)).     
